Important Problems in AI

Epistemic status: Zero novel contributions, and probably not an outstanding summary either. Writing this down to clarify my own thoughts.

First, it’s worth stating the risks posed by AI:⁠[1]

  1. Human extinction from misaligned AI (see IABIED). Human enslavement by machines.
  2. Techno-oligarchy, concentration of power.
  3. Mass casualty events from rogue actors with powerful AI (eg engineered pandemics).
  4. Crisis of meaning once almost no one can contribute meaningful work.
  5. Mass protests and economic turmoil from job displacement.
  6. Not a risk per se, but it would be sad if friendly superintelligence is possible, but we don’t build it because we can’t figure out alignment or there’s a massive backlash. I’m excited for the Glorious Transhumanist Future, conditioned on alignment being tractable.

Things get orders of magnitude less important as you move down this list, with the exception of (6).⁠[2]


Next, it’s worth stating what people are working on:⁠[3]

1. Alignment: Make AIs That Are Corrigible and Share Our Values #

Alignment is the most important problem to solve in AI safety. Almost trivially, if the AI shares our values it will help us and vice versa.

We have made lots of progress in ‘quotidian alignment.’ Claude won’t assume the persona of Hitler or tell you how to bully a child.

In addition to solving the problem of technical alignment, we need to determine our ‘alignment target.’ Should superintelligent AI help us factory farm? Should humans be allowed to ‘enslave’ it? To what extent should its values be corrigible?

There are strong theoretical arguments for why alignment is hard or impossible. I hope to summarize these myself in the future; for today Claude will write a footnote with pointers to the most important arguments.⁠[4]

2. Control: Build Robust Monitoring So That Misaligned AIs Can’t Do Much Harm on Their Own #

If we train a misaligned AI, how likely are we to catch it? We can run millions of alignment tests during training and evaluation. If the model acts aligned in all of them, either:

Mitigations include:

3. Security #

It would be really bad if:

Humanity should spend a huge amount of effort getting better at cybersecurity, and in particular, at securing the weights to frontier models.

4. Safeguards #

Cambridge researchers reported on Boko Haram using chatbots to build bombs. We’ll be much sadder if they use Chat to build bioweapons or nukes.

Mitigations:

Safeguards work well, which is why I’m not a fan of open weight models. You can’t run classifiers on them. You can’t patch jailbreaks. You can’t revoke access if your model proves to be more dangerous than anticipated.

5. Interpretability #

Can we determine why models make the decisions they do? Which parts of the network and training data are responsible? Are models aware they’re being evaluated? Can we convince them otherwise? Do they behave differently in deployment vs training? Can we detect misaligned models by studying their weights and activations?

6. Pandemic Preparedness #

Make far-UVC better, mass produce it, and install it in public places. Leverage AI to detect vaccines more quickly. Improve mass monitoring of sewage so that we detect novel pathogens, not just known ones. Build newer and better monitoring infrastructure.⁠[5]

7. Coordination, Race Dynamics, Lab Governance #

Lots of people have signed lots of letters since we should slow down because AI might kill us all. This hasn’t resulted in much legislation or training pauses. Coordination is hard.

8. Welfare #

Are AIs moral subjects? What does it mean to treat them humanely? Can we make mutually beneficial deals with AIs?

9. Disinformation #

Improve AI-detection techniques (see Pangram). Improve watermarking. Proactively monitor for AI-led disinformation campaigns.

10. Economic Policies (UBI, etc) #

It is not obvious to me what economic policies make sense post-AGI. See my bullshit jobs post.

11. Capabilities #

If we get 1-10 right, our cookie at the end is ASI, which will hopefully then deliver health, immortality, material abundance, scientific advancement, body enhancement, uploading, wireheading, or whatever else you’re into.

Conclusion #

There is a massive amount of work to be done. All of these fields have low-hanging fruit. I’m having a hard time deciding where to start! Writing this post did not convince me of what I should do, but it did convince me I should do something.


Notes #

  1. Not exhaustive. ↩︎

  2. Human civilization can be unimaginably larger and better than it is today. Plausibly the most important thing is to grab the GTF once we can reach it. ↩︎

  3. Not exhaustive. ↩︎

    • Orthogonality + instrumental convergence: intelligence and goals are independent, and almost any goal is served by acquiring power and resisting shutdown (Bostrom, 2012; Omohundro, 2008).
    • Inner misalignment: a training process that selects for good behavior can produce a learned optimizer with a different objective that merely agrees on the training distribution (Hubinger et al., 2019).
    • Goal misgeneralization: capabilities generalize out of distribution while goals don’t, demonstrated empirically in RL agents (Langosco et al., 2022; Shah et al., 2022).
    • Specification gaming / Goodhart: any measurable proxy for what we want gets optimized in ways we didn’t intend (Krakovna et al., 2020).
    • Deceptive alignment: a misaligned model that understands training has an incentive to act aligned until it’s safe not to, and this behavior survives safety training once present (Hubinger, 2022; Sleeper Agents, 2024; Alignment Faking, 2024).
    • Corrigibility is anti-natural: an agent that wants X is incentivized to prevent you changing it away from X, so shutdownability fights against coherent goal-pursuit (Soares et al., 2015).
    • Value is fragile: human values are high-dimensional and getting almost all of them right still yields a worthless future (Yudkowsky, 2009).
    • Limits of human feedback: RLHF can’t scale past the point where humans can evaluate outputs, and systematically rewards what looks good over what is good (Casper et al., 2023).
    • No retries: unlike every other engineering problem, the first superintelligence has to be aligned on the first try, with no ability to iterate on failure (Yudkowsky, 2022).
    • For the counterargument that these are real but tractable, see Christiano, 2022.
    ↩︎
  4. One founder suggested to me that our toothbrushes might, in the future, check our saliva for novel pathogens every night. A sufficiently capable adversary could create a virus that lays dormant for months, or makes us infertile in a way that’s hard to detect. ↩︎